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I. Introduction:
                              In comparison with high income countries, most developing countries are
characterized by higher levels of government intervention, greater corruption in the
bureaucracy, red tape and a legal system that is often too complicated in substantive law and
too sluggish with respect to law enforcement
1. Long delays in deciding cases, corruption in
the judiciary, and the resulting high costs involved in going to courts is a common complaint
in the low and middle income countries
2. Such an environment is not conducive to the smooth
functioning of the market: It is often the case that this constitutes an environment of high risk
to business and make the reliance of firms on markets less secure. In particular this affects the
strength and effectiveness of contracts: the implication is that a breach of contract is likely to
go unpunished and /or proves to be very expensive to enforce. This in itself can give rise to
opportunistic behavior on part of the contracting parties to take undue advantage of each
other. In other words, contracts, howsoever complete they may be, cannot be relied on to the
same extent as in countries with a well developed legal system. This constitutes a constraint
on doing business in such countries
3. Under such circumstances, contracts would have to
either be relational or self-enforcing. Anonymous market transactions can be trusted as long
as no circumstances arise, between the time of the agreement of the contract and delivery, that
would render a breach of contract profitable. Thus, the two important characteristics that
differentiate the legal environment in developing countries from those in the developed or
high income countries are:
(a) Enforcement of contracts is less effective. Therefore as a consequence,
(b) Probability of breach of contracts is higher
This has implications, at the firm level, when it comes to buying inputs, for the production of
a final good, and for holding finished goods inventories. When market transaction becomes
expensive or risky the firm would seek alternative ways of reducing the risks
4.
This paper suggests that the decision to hold inventories as a buffer against the hazards of
transacting on the market in an weak legal environment could be another alternative apart
from vertical integration considerations. It sees the amount of inventories, both raw materials
as well as finished goods, as a function of the quality of the legal system and therefore
deviates from the traditional explanation for inventories
5.
Turning our attention to contract theory, there is extensive literature on the link between weak
property rights, contract enforcement and economic development
6. At a firm level, the recent
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focus has been on analysing the nature of contracts and their role in the allocation of control
rights to make for efficient decision making. This framework is used to analyse joint-ventures
that firms undertake, and also the structure of internal organisations
7. Relational contracts
have been seen as a important ingredient in determining the way indiviudals behave within
firms and has also been used to comment on the extent of integration that firms would
undertake.
Although it has been observed that the absence of well-functioning contract enforcement
institutions can drive individuals and companies to choose to be more self sufficient and avoid
frequent engagement in complicated non-self enforcing contracts
8, there are no studies that
suggest that inventories can also be a way to counteract weak contract enforcement
9. We
hypothesize that for firms operating in weak legal environments, the ratio of inventories to net
sales would be higher than in firms that operate in strong legal environments. We use the
Inventory to sales ratios to remove the effects of different currencies and inflation so as to
have a comparable variable across counries. The decision to hold a greater proportion of
assets as inventories in countries with a weak enforcement system has further implications:
Holding inventories is, in effect, locking up capital which would otherwise have been
operating in the economic system. If firms hold significantly large quantities of inventories on
account of the factors mentioned above, then this would constitute some sort of a ‘Social
Cost’ associated with idle capital. This social cost would be a direct consequence of weak
legal institutions
10.
We test this hypothesis with a cross-section analysis by collecting the following data:
1) Data on the strength of the legal system in different countries: Here we use proxy data on
Property rights taken from the index of economic freedom of the Heritage foundation and data
from the Perception of Corruption index from Transparency international.
2) Data on  inventories and sales from three hundred and seventy eight firm level observations
across fourteen comparable products across thirty nine countries.
 In addition to the above variables we include product dummies as well as regional dummies.
The regional Dummies are based upon the countries that are similar in their cultural and
geographical environments and /or their economic standings. We also control for other factors
which determine inventory holdings such as the real interest rate, the quality of the transport
infrastructure, the firm’s output volatility and the ability of the firm to opt out of the national
legal system (for example if the firm is a subsidary of a multinational corporation). It turns out
that the hypothesis is strongly supported by the data with respect to property rights. In
countries with weak legal enforcement, inventory holdings (as a percentage of sales) are
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significantly higher as when compared to countries with strong legal enforcement. This could
explain in part the reason that countries with weak legal systems are also the ones which have
a large Capital-Output ratio in comparison with countries with a strong law enforcement
system. This obviously has implications for economic growth. Secondly, to the extent that
inventories represent locked up capital, the study uncovers the presence of “dead Capital”
11
within the purview of legally sanctioned operations in contrast to looking for the existence of
locked up capital in the extra legal sphere. The three control variables were not statistically
significant as factors that explain variations in the inventory to sales ratios across countries
but the fact that a firm belongs to a multinational corporation made a significant difference in
that all such firms have comparitively small inventory to sales ratios.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we develop the main hypothesis for the study
from a simple model on contract compliance with inventory holding. Section IV contains the
information on the Data, the variables, and their measurement. Section V is devoted to the
estimation and results. Section VI contains the conclusions.
II The Hypothesis:
Firms hold inventories in almost all spheres of manufacturing activities. Inventories usually
comprise of three categories:
a) Raw Materials, b) Work-in Progress, and  c) Finished Goods.
 12.
We set out below the arguments that link the first and the last category of inventories with the
strength of the legal enforcement system:
The case for holding inventories of raw materials:
Consider the case for holding inventories of raw materials: An input supplier, who has an
agreed upon contract with a final goods producer usually would have a contract which would
specify the price at which the input would be supplied, the quantity and quality of the input. In
addition to this, there maybe a specified number of times which the input is supplied during
the contract period. The contract would usually also contain a clause that safeguards against a
breach.
For the purposes of analysis, we define a “Weak Legal System” (WLS) as one where
compensation for a breach of contract is difficult to be enforced effectively and wherein the
probability of breach is large, in comparison to a system where contracts are effectively
enforceable. In a perfect legal system, breaches occur only if it is efficient, that is, if between
the conclusion of the contract and delivery, events occur which completely wipes out any
surplus from the contract. In a weak legal system breach occurs if events occur between the
conclusion of the contract and delivery, that renders breach profitable ( in the absence of
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damages for the breaching party) for one party even though there remains a net surplus from
the contract. By default, a “Strong Legal System” (SLS) is where a breach of contract, if it
occurs, is enforced quickly and effectively, and, as a consequence, the probability of breach is
smaller.
There can be many reasons why input suppliers may find it to their advantage to breach the
contract.  Some of the reasons why a breach of contract could become a possibility are the
following:
a) The market price of the input is higher than the agreed upon price: Under a strong legal
system, a breach of contract may not be profitable but under a sluggish legal system, wherein
enforcement of damages may not be effective, it could become profitable for the supplier to
breach the contract and sell in the open market at a higher price.
b) The input supplier finds that his cost of production has gone up and would prefer to sell the
input when market conditions favor him better:  In such a case it might become profitable to
breach the contract.When a breach takes place, with a weak legal environment the firm which
loses has very little by way of law to obtain compensation: Firstly, there is the problem of
procedures- which are often long and time consuming. Secondly there is the question of
dealing with Judges and law enforcement agencies which need to be appeased by substantial
rents for putting the law into effect. Knowing this, a firm which buys and needs the input, and
would suffer a high loss in case of a breach or late delivery, would invariably store input as
inventory and use this to insulate itself from the risk of uncertain supply. This quantity of
inventory would be greater when compared with a firm that operates in a market in which
each breach would lead to a quick and full compensation of expectation damages to a specific
performance claim or to a substitute contract, the marginal costs of which have to be borne by
the breaching party.
Therefore we hypothesize a positive relationship between the the level of inventories ( as a
percentage of sales) and the quality of the legal system.
A MODEL OF INVENTORY WITH CONTRACT COMPLIANCE :
This argument can be illustrated in a simple way:
Consider a manufacturer 'M' and an input supplier 'S'. Assume that the contract between them
requires S to supply M with a quantity of input   at an agreed upon price. Assume that this is
the only input required for the production of a final product. We define:
D = quantity of input delivered to M by S as per a contractual agreement. This is assumed to
be a “just in time delivery” and that payment for this is made upon delivery.
I = Quantity of the input held as Inventory by M.
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q  = Price of the input
i  = Market Rate of interest.
p  = Price of output y sold on a competitive market.
y = f (D) is the production function for the output with the properties: f ‘(D) > 0 and
f ’’(D) < 0.
w = Probability of “performance” of the contract.  In other words the probability that the input
would be delivered by S to M as agreed upon by them in a contract is given by w.
It is assumed that in the event of just in time delivery taking place, the firm would not use any
inventory that it has. The expected profits can be defined as:
(1)                       EΠ =  w { p f ( D ) - qD - iqI} + (1 - w) { p f ( I ) - ( 1+ i ) qI}
That is to say, if there is delivery, then the firm would use the delivered amount to produce
the final product. Hence the additional cost of holding inventories is simply the market rate of
interest multiplied with the value of inventories. However if there is a breach of the contract,
then there will be no delivery (D = 0) and the firm would then have to use its inventories of
the input to produce the final product. Absent a legal system that can enforce compensation
for breach, there would also be included the cost of buying this amount of inventory on the
market, which is given by qI. Hence the total cost in this case would be qI the cost of the input
plus the cost of holding the inventory, iqI.
The firm maximizes the expected profits by choosing its quantity delivered D and the level of
inventories I :
(2)                                                   ∂EΠ/∂D =  w P f ‘( D ) - w q = 0.
(3)                                     ∂EΠ/∂I  =  P f ‘( I ) - q - iq - wP f ‘( I ) + wq = 0
A) Complete compliance with the contract: w = 1.
It is easily seen that if there is full compliance with the contract by S at all times, then the
optimal level of inventories I * can never be positive:
Since full and complete compliance implies that w = 1, and equation (3) implies that,
-iq = 0 which is not possible. Hence no interior solution exists for an optimal I. Under such
conditions, profits will greatest when I* = 0 since profits are negatively related to inventories.
Given this result, consider the case where there exists a legal system but there is less than full
compliance. The legal system is efficient in that  there exists a strong enforcement mechanism
which enables the manufacture to obtain compensatory damages from the supplier S for
having breached the contract. Then profits are equal in the case of breach and non- breach, as
S has to pay full damage compensation. Therefore in such a case also the optimal inventory
must be zero for maximizing profits. Thus the above model can be taken to represent the
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case where, even though the compliance of a contract is not one hundred percent, the
presence of a strong legal system would make the profits accruing to the firm EQUAL to
that when
 w = 1.
But if there is no damage compensation, inventory must become positive to maximize profits.
We show this in the next case:
B) Case of less than full compliance: 0 < w < 1.
In this case the optimal value of I will be positive since, from equation (3) we have,
(4)                                       f ‘ ( I ) =  q [1 + i - w ] / p (1 - w)
Let I* be such a value of I. This is shown in figure 1:
Thus the level of  I is positive if we believe that there is no damage compensation on account
of the breach.
Now let us assume that the probability of performance, w, falls. Diffrentiating the equilibrium
condition with respect to w yields:
(5)                                        d (f ’(I)) / dw = iq/ p (w-1)   > 0
Given the nature of the function f ‘( I ), we see that the optimal value of I must fall with a rise
in w. Recall that a weak legal system was defined as one in which the probability of breach of
contract was higher than in a stronger legal system. Thus if we have w° and w* representing,
two different levels of probabilities of performance, and I° and I* the optimal inventory levels
associated with the values w° and w* respectively, then we have, unambiguously, for all w° <
w* , I° > I*. From this follows that:
The optimal level of inventory holdings would be:
a) Zero under a legal system where enforcement of damage compensation is certain and there
are no other uncertainities.
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b) Positive where enforcement is not effective.
Furthermore,
c) given that enforcement is not effective, the optimal level of inventory holdings would be
greater when the probability of breach rises.
The case for holding inventories of finished goods:
Assume now that a retailer finds it advantageous to breach the contract with a manufacturer.
If the contract has a clause that safeguards such a breach, then the manufacturer would have to
be paid compensation.
The reasons why a retailer may want to breach the contract are not difficult to find : The most
likely reason being the availability of a cheaper substitute. If contract enforcement was strong,
then this may lead to a re-negotiation of the terms and conditions; however, if the
enforcement is weak, then the retailer may simply breach the contract leaving the
manufacturer with unsold inventories of finished goods. Knowing this, the manufacturers
would also prefer to operate on the spot market and not rely entirely on contractual
agreements with customers. Under these conditions also, the manufacturer would have to
keep inventories of finished goods to counter spot market fluctuations. The inventories for
finished goods are then higher, because firms which would prefer to produce on demand are
more driven to produce for the spot market, which leads to higher inventories due to market
fluctuations. The upshot of this argument is that in either case --higher inventories would be
held in the form of finished goods as well. Thus it is expected  that inventory holdings (both
inventory of raw materials as well as inventories of finished goods) would be comparatively
higher in countries with weak enforcement records than in countries where the enforcement is
strong.
The third component of inventories, namely work-in progress inventories is related to the
efficiency of the production system. We donot believe that this would be affected by weak
contract enforcement. One possibility is that production is affected by uncertainity in the input
supply, which in turn is related in our model to weak contract enforcment, and that the firm
doesnot have the necessary mechanisms to counter this uncertainity even in the form of
holding inventory of raw materials. But this is precisely what we show not to be the case if the
firms are profit maximisers. Hence, we assume that production itself is carried on most
efficiently as possible. Given that work-in-progress is not affected , ceterius paribus, the
increase in inventory holdings of the other two components of inventories would increase the
overall level of inventory holding vis a vis the sales.
We summarize the above arguments into a hypothesis that we test with empirical evidence:
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Hypothesis:  Firms in countries with a weak legal enforcement of contracts face a
relatively high quota of contract breaches with corresponding loss of earnings. They can
buffer against these losses by increasing their inventories. Therefore we expect the ratio
of inventory to sales  in firms operating in countries with weak legal systems would be
significantly higher than for firms operating in countries with strong legal systems.
IV. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics:
A) The Data Set:
The data on the level of inventory holdings has been collected from an online portal
shibuimarkets.com which publishes a three year financial highlight firm-wise, in all the
countries under the world bank listings for 14 comparable product categories. The years
covered are from 1997-98 to 2002-3. In some cases the data was collected from other
secondary sources such as government records and private online providers 
13.
COUNTRIES: The countries covered were selected from the world bank classification of
High Income, Upper Middle Income, Lower Middle Income, and Low Income countries. In
all 39 countries were covered in which 20 countries belonged to the high income group and
the rest  comprised of Upper Middle Income (9),  Lower Middle Income (7) group, and Low
Income (3) group. There is reason to believe that the legal environment across this
classification of countries varies substantially: Generally, countries with strong legal systems
and low levels of government intervention are the High income countries whereas those with
weak legal systems and considerable government intervention in economic activity are the
Middle and Low income countries. While it would have been ideal to have a selection of
countries from the different continents, this was not possible. For example, Africa proved to
be difficult as the companies were very small and were mostly not listed on the big stock
exchanges- or those that were belonged to non-comparable product groups such as diamonds
and gold. The same was true of Russia. However, the data is representative of Asia, East Asia,
Latin America, European Union, Transition Economies, and North American Continient.
Table 1 below provides the list of countries.
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THE PRODUCT GROUPS:
This proved to be the most difficult part of the empirical work. It is crucial to keep in mind
that, when comparing a firm specific variable such as inventories across firms in different
countries, one should, as far as possible, select firms that are producing only one and the same
product. In so far as this sounds obivious, what is not so clear is the definition of a “product”.
The International Standard Industrial Classification is done at various levels of disagrregation,
with the two digit level to the more disaggregate three digit and four digit levels. Comparing
products at the two digit level of clasification can pose problems since many diverse products
are aggregated into the classification. For example, in a two digit clssification, one can find,
under the heading “Chemicals and Allied Products”establishments producing basic chemicals,
and establishments manufacturing products by predominantly chemical processes.
Establishments classified in this major group manufacture three general classes of products:
(1) basic chemicals, such as acids, alkalies, salts, and organic chemicals; (2) chemical
products to be used in further manufacture, such as synthetic fibers, plastics materials, dry
colors, and pigments; and (3) finished chemical products to be used for ultimate consumption,
such as drugs, cosmetics, and soaps; or to be used as materials or supplies in other industries,
such as paints, fertilizers, and explosives. There is reason to believe that firms from these
different subgroups may have different product specific reasons for holding or not holding
inventories. Similarly, in the case for „Building and Construction“, all firms that were
classified under this and were engaged in real estate development or were only contractual
operators were not chosen. Instead only firms that were engaged in the construction activities
were considered. Therefore as far as possible, the study has tried to focus on very specific
product groups, at times under the three and four digit classification. The trade off was that
going in for „clean“ one  product firms came at the cost of getting fewer firms across
countries. Thus in cases where the number of firms were too small to be representative, some
amount of aggregation was seen to be necessary. All attempts were made, to focus on specific
products that were comparable.
There is a second problem associated with the first and this relates to the Multiproduct nature
of most firms. By selecting products from fairly disaggregated industry classification, the
danger that a single firm may be operating in diverse product groups, and therefore its
inventory levels are not comparable to another firm that only operates in the specific product
group, is mitigated to a large extent.
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B) The Time Period : The period coverd by the study is between 1997 and 2003. However,
within this time span for any single firm the data was available for only 3 consecutive years.
Restricting the data set to a common 3 year period resulted in a loss of substantial amount of
observations. Since a 3 year average was being calculated, it was felt that a variation of one or
two years could be allowed for.
C) The Independent Variables : Data on the  “Quality of legal Systems”:
There is a growing body of literature that has been devoted to construction of indices
across countries that can reflect some aspects of the legal systems in those countries. Notable
among such attempts are those by Transparency International and the Heritage foundation
studies on degree of economic freedom. There are two important determinants of the
effectiveness of the legal system that can act as a proxy of the strength or weakness of a legal
system:
a) Protection of Property Rights,
b) Corruption Index
We use the index constructed by the Heritage foundation studies for the Index of Economic
Freedom 2003 for Property rights and the Transparency International Corruption perception
index.
a)  Protection of Property Rights:
According to the text, Property Rights
“scores the degree to which private property rights are
protected and the degree to which the government enforces laws
that protect private property. It also accounts for the
possibility that private property will be expropriated. In
addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the
existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability
of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The less
legal protection of property, the higher the score; similarly,
the greater the chances of government expropriation of
property, the higher the score.’’ (Italics ours).
 This index is on a scale from 1 to 5, the number 1 reflecting very strong protection of
property rights and progressively weaker protection as the index value increases. A value of 1
reflects very efficient contract enforcement and prompt redressal. Values from 2 onwards
reflect court delays. Values from 3 onwards have corruption as an added factor with weak
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contract enforcement Values 4 and 5 have the added problem of expropriation of private
property and non-independence of the judiciary from political influence.
b) Corruption Index: This relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by
business people and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly
corrupt). The CPI is derived from 15 different surveys that garner the perceptions of both
residents and expatriates, both business people and risk analysts, the index provides a
snapshot of the views of decision-makers, who take key decisions on investment and trade.
   The index on Corruption rises from 1 to 10 with a rise reflecting cleaner and better legal
systems. Among the questions asked in the construction of the index are those that are related
to corruption in the judiciary and extra payments that may be necessary in order to induce
judgements that favour parties. Although not directly related to contract enforcement it
nevertheless provides a broader picture of the legal environment of a country.
C) The Dependent Variable: The main variable under study is Inventory Holdings. The ratio
of Total Inventories to Net Sales is used to as the dependent variablein order to remove
currency and inflation effects and to correct for firm size
14. This was calculated from the
Financial Statements of companies published in the online Portal. The period covered is for
three years between 1997and 2003 as explained above. The data is averaged over this period
to smoothen yearly fluctuations.
Inventories are in turn composed of mainly three components: Raw Materials, Work-in -
progress, and Finished Goods. We expect that the greater is the weakness of legal institutions
that a firm faces, the larger would be the inventories as a percentage of sales. This can be both
for finished goods inventories as well as for Raw materials as argued in the development of
the hypothesis above.
Thus the  Inventory Quota,  INQ = Inventories / Net Sales.
The data was obtained from the financial highlights of firms published in the online portal
Shibui Markets.The three year average INQ  was calculated for each company for each
product across the countries.
D) Dummy Variables:
Product dummies: Each product was assigned a dummy to capture any product specific
varaiations influencing inventory holdings. Thus there are 14 product dummies in all.
Region dummies: Region dummies were included in order to capture all cultural, social and/
or gepgraphical differences that might influence ways of doing business across firms
15. In
particular, the data was grouped under the headings : i) USA and Canada and Australia ii)
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Latin America, iii) Europe  (E.U before expansion) iv) Europe-non EU ( mainly the transition
countries) , v) India and Bangladesh, vi) China and vii) East Asia (including Japan).   
Connectedness Dummy: It has been generally observed that firms that have subsidaires that
operate in different countries may opt out of the legal system of the particular country in
which they operate and instead have contracts whose enforcment depends upon the legal
systems of their own home countries or of third countries wherein they are quickly processed
and redressed. In such circumstances, it can be reasonably argued that inventory levels will
have little to do with the nature of the legal system of the country in which they are operating
in. Thus we assign the number “1” if a firm is a subsidiary of a Multinational and “0” if it is
independent. If the dummy turns out to be significant, we would expect it to have a negative
sign with respect to inventory to Sales ratio.
E) Economic Variables:
The Real Rate of Interest: The real rate of interest is an important variable in the decision to
hold inventories as it represents the opportunity cost of Capital. We expect that the higher the
realrates of interest, the lower would be the economic incentive to hold inventories. The real
interest rate was obtained from the World bank Development Indicators Data Base.
Infrastructure Index: This is a composite index that was calculated from the World Bank
Data taken from the world development indicators 2003. Specifically the data on a) Roads per
Capita, b) Rail per Capita, and c) Telephones, both land lines and mobiles, per thousand for
each country was collected and then was normalised to have a mean zero and unitary variance
for each variable and then was added up for each country yeilding a composite index of
Infrastructure. The larger the number, the better the infrastructure for that country. We expect
a negative relationship between inventory to Sales ratios and infrastructure. It is has been
found that better communications can have a negative effect on inventories
16. Similarly, better
transportation facilities would mean that inventories would not be accumulated merely to
buffer against transport delays. Thus the composite index hopes to control for these two
effects which can have a influence on inventories apart from considerations of weak
enforcement of contracts. Thus the worse is the communications and transport facilities of a
country, the higher would we expect the inventories as a percenrtage of sales to be.
Output Volatility: Output volatility can have a significant effect on the decision to hold
inventories. We hypothesise that the greater the output volatility, the larger would be
inventories to sales ratios. In one sense this variable  allows for the more traditional effects
that have been part of inventory theory literature to be captured- that of uncertainity in the
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demand conditions. Out-put Volatility was calculated as the coefficient of variation of the
output levels for each firm for the 3 year period
17.
F) Descriptive Statistics:
Next we provide information on the Mean values  of the inventory to Sales ratios calculated
for the individual country groups and  plot the average inventories to sales ratios of firms
from the  seven regional groups described by the regional dummies against the Property rights
(average) Index for each of the groups. The first two observations are the two groups of
countries a) USA, Canada, and Australia and b) European Union. The next three are the
Transition countries, Latin America and East Asia (including Japan). The last two are India-
Bangla desh and China. There is a clear indication that Inventory to sales quota rises as the














The table below provides the list of countries and the number of firms from each country from
the different product groups.
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TABLE:1:
COUN. AgCh Bev Bu&Con Cem Coal EleMach FabMet FabProd HouApp Leath Phar Plas Steel Tobac Tyre
GRP1 No.Fir TFPC
U.S.A 32 3 2 1 2 33 32 1 126
CAN 11 2 11 2 1 9
AUST 11 1 1 1 1 6
GRUP2
MEX 11 3 3 1 9
ARG 11 2 1 5
PER 11 1 2 1 2 1 1 10
CHL 12 1 1 3 8
BRA 21 1 1 3 1 1 3 13
VNZ 11 2
COL 11 2 1 1 6
GRP3
AUS 11 1 1 4
BEL 21 2 1 1 12 10
DAN 1 1 2
FIN 11 1 1 1 5
FRA 33 1 3 1 1 2 1 15
GER 41 3 12 111 1 2 1 1 1 20
GRE 11 1 2 1 6
ITA 12 1 2 1 1 1 1 10
IRE 1 1
NTHL 11 1 1 1 5
LUX 1 1 2
NOR 11 1 1 4
POR 11 2
SPA 12 2 1 1 7
SWI 11 1 2 1 6
SWE 211 1 5
UK 21 2 1 1 2 1 10
GRP4
CRO 1 1
CZE 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
HUN 12 3
POL 11 1 3
GRP5
IND 42 33 4 3 2 26 45 2 444
BGD 12 4 7
GRP6
CHN 121 3 1 1 6 715 28
GRP7
IDN 11 1 3
THAI 31 1 1 1 2 1 10
MLY 11 3 2 1 2 1 2 7 1 21
PHI 11 11 1 1 6
JPN 22 212 5 3 2 3 4 23 1 234
No.F: 25 28 24 27 14 31 20 10 31 16 45 22 54 16 15 378
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V. The Methodology, Estimation and Results:
A) The Methodology: To test the hypothesis would require that a cross-country study of the
extent of variation in inventory holdings ( as a percentage of Net Sales) be explained by
differences in the legal environments of the countries. The cross-section study uses OLS
estimates to regress the dependent variable, with the proxies for weak legal systems and the
other variables to control for other effects.
The following tests were followed in order to make the regression more econometrically
robust:
i)The Problem of Outliers: OLS estimation is particularly prone to outliers. Outliers create
problems if their presence is the one that drives the results (to accept the hypothesis). This
then would represent a misrepresentation of the actual facts. Usually the removal of outliers
would then render results insignificant. In our case we tested for the presence of outliers by
the method of Bi-Variate plotting with each of the proxies of the legal system and the
dependent variable. Two firm level outliers that had grotesque numbers were identified and
removed. However, we add that the results were statistically significant even in the presence
of the outliers. Their removal however did not reverse the statistical significance of our results
but strenghted the significance.
ii) White Test for Hetroscadasticity : Cross section data is expected to have the problem of
heteroscdasticity and the White test was chosen as an option to correct the T-Values for the
presence of Hetroscadasticity while running the regression software.
iii) RAMSAY RESET Test : The OLS regression was  tested for the possibility of mis-
specification using the Ramsay Reset Test. For the two variables which stand as proxies
for the legal system, the tests proved that there existed a non-linear relationship between
the inventory to Sales ratios and the proxies. Therefore the results reported below are for
such specifications, although the R-square values were higher in the case of a linear
relationship, this did not pass the Ramsay reset test.
iv) Multicollinearity: It was expected that there would be severe multicollinearity between
the two proxies representing the legal system. One way out is construct a composite index.
The second option was to run regressions using the proxies independently with the control
variables. The second option was chosen because we felt that the Property Rights index would
best represent our hypothesises, although the other Index is expected to have significant,
albeit relatively less, effect compared to the Property Rights Index. The infrastructure variable
is highly correlated with the proxies of the legal system, and hence was seperately included in
the regression analysis.
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A) The Results of the regression on Inventory Holdings to Net Sales with
Property Rights:
The regressions were run with all the product dummies, and the regional dummies and those
that were not significant were removed from the analysis. Their removal corrects for the R-
square values and doesnot unneccesarily inflate it. The following Table:2: gives us the best
model specification that could have been obtained. As is evident from the table for property
rights, the results show that property rights is significant and has a positive sign with respect
to the Log of Inventory to net sales ratio, suggesting that indeed the level of property rights
protection in a country has a siginficant bearing on the decosion to hold inventories. We also
find that the real interest rate as well as the connectedness dummy are significant and have




White Heternsistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CONNECTED -0.451036 0.113662 -3.968202 0.0001
REALINT -0.007062 0.00 -2.447356 0.0149
BEV -0.741572 0.123548 -6.002324 0.0000
CEMENT -0.341290 0.100324 -3.401874 0.0007
COAL -0.759200 0.178883 -4.244123 0.0000
TYRES -0.216763 0.090844 -2.386112 0.0175
C 2.775071 0.057425 48.32520 0.0000
PROPT^2 0.036328 0.006263 5.800236 0.0000
R-squared 0.177302     Mean dependent var 2.815995
Adjusted R-squared 0.161653     S.D. dependent var 0.769988
S.E. of regression 0.705011     Akaike info criterion 2.159840
Sum squared resid 182.9109     Schwarz criterion 2243449
Log likelihood -398.0500     F-statistic 11.32985
The model specification passed the Ramsay Reset test. When tested for mis-specification the
F-Statistic was 0.25  which means that the fitted value is not significantly different from the
observed values. The table is reproduced in the appendix.
C) The Results of the regression on Inventory Holdings to Net Sales with Corruption:
The corruption Index also proves to be significantly related to the level of inventory to total
assets ratios. The sign on the coefficient is negative showing that firms operating in cleaner
environments hold a lower percentage of their assets in the form of inventories.
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Table:2:
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CONNECTED -0.450306 0.114554 -3.930955 0.0001
REALINT -0.005204 0.003263 -1.594974 0.1116
BEV -0.758699 0.129392 -5.863572 0.0000
CEMENT -0.323026 0.101147 -3.193631 0.0015
COAL -0.792199 0.179730 -4.407726 0.0000
TYRES -0.255981 0.104659 -2.445850 0.0149
C 3.151376 0.101786 30.96087 0.0000
CORRUP^2 -0.004383 0.001545 -2.837170 0.0048
R-squared 0.140333     Mean dependent var 2.815995
Adjusted R-squared 0.123981     S.D. dependent var 0.769988
S.E. of regression 0.720677     Akaike info criterion 2.203797
Sum squared resid 191.1303     Schwarz criterion 2.287405
Log likelihood -406.3138     F-statistic 8.581827
Durbin-Watson stat 1.730015     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Ramsey RESET Test:
F-statistic 1.114236     Probability 0.291857
Log likelihood ratio 1.139831     Probability 0.285688
We note that the connectedness dummy remains significant although the real interest rate is no longer
significant at the 10 percent level. The Ramsay Reset statiscal table for this regression is reproduced
in the appendix. Also as expected, the R- squared value has fallen when compared toi the property
rights index which suggests that corruption is related to the dependent variable only in so far it is an
indicator of the general business environment of risk in different countries, which has its influence on
doing business in general.
E) Results with Ouput Volatility Included:
Output Volatility did not prove to be significant when regressed with the proxies for the legal system
and hence the tables are not reproduced here. The results are the same if Output Volatility is taken as
a independent separate explanatory variable of inventories to sales ratios. Nor did it prove significant
when entered non-linearly into the analysis.
F) Results with Infrastructure included: Infra Structure is highly correlated with the Indexes for the
legal system and hence cannot be used together with them. Taken seperately, the infrastructure
variable is siginificant but the ramsay test shows that the model is misspecified. Using the Log of
inventories to Sales ratios with the infrastructure entering non-linearly results in a better specification
but the results are not significant.
G) Results with Regional Dummies: The regional dummies were not significant with the exception of
China. China proved to significant when coupled with the corruption index but not with respect to
property rights. The result is reported in the table in appendix. The regression passed the Ramsay
reset test.
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V) SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS:
In this study we have analyzed the cross country differences in the extent of Inventories to
Sales ratios across comparable industry groups across countries which vary substantially in
the functioning of the legal systems. We postulate that countries with weak legal
environments in which the enforcement of contracts is often difficult and law is sluggish, and
where a weak law enforcement gives rise to corrupt practices and the operation of a black
market, firms would prefer to, ceteris paribus, hold higher inventories to insulate themselves
from the uncertainties of weak contract enforcement. This aspect of the problem concentrates
on the ex-post problems in enforceability of a contract. We hypothesize that weak legal
environments and corruption can actually drive firms to hold larger quantities of inventories
as a buffer against the hazards of the market. In this model, we treat inventories as a way to
maintain the same level of benefit as would be under a regime where enforcement is strong.
We show that that the level of inventory holdings would ceteris paribus rise with the
probability of breach and under no enforcement. We test this theory with empirical evidence
using three hundred and seventy eight firm level observations on inventory-Sales ratios across
fourteen comparable products across thirty-nine countries. First, we find strong non-linear
support for this hypotheses wherein inventories to sales ratios rise rapidly as the the legal
environment weakens. Secondly, the variable Corruption has a significant positive impact on
the holding of inventories although Property Rights best explains the variation. However,
infrastructure, output volatility and real interest rates, although are of the expected signs, are
not statistically significant in explaining variations in inventories to sales ratios. We believe
that the results have important implications at the firm level as well as at the macrolevel of the
economy: Inventories constitute raw materials, work in progress, and finished goods. Holding
inventories is, in effect, locking up capital which would otherwise have been operating in the
economic system.  A large inventory to Sales ratio would means that the company has a lower
inventory turnover ratio ( which is cost of sales divided by avarage inventory levels) which
points to excessive accumulation of inventories. Our results suggest that this is tha case for
lower-middle and low income countries, and this has a significant c onnection to the strenght
of the legal system. Low inventory turnover ratios are not considered to be a healthy sign for
companies as it indicates excess of stocks over sales and /or poor sales. However, in our
regressions output volatility did not seem to play a significant role for us to conclude that
sales were lower in these countries compared to the high income countries. Even if that were
the case, there is no reason for inventories to be systematically higher for firms would adjust
the inventory levels to proper proportions. A second consequence of this is that this must lead
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to a higher Capital-output ratio in developing countries compared to developed countries. If
firms hold significantly large quantities of inventories on account of the factors mentioned
above, then this would constitute some sort of a ‘Social loss’ associated with idle capital. This
social loss would be a direct consequence of weak legal institutions- a weak contract law
being one such institution.
Thus the study uncovers one way in which the operation or rather non-operation of the legal
structure results in the accumulation of “dead capital” to use De Soto’s terminology. But this,
unlike his theory, happens even inside the purview of sanctioned legal operations: The firms
themselves.
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END NOTES
                                                          
1 Trebilcock, M.J in Buscaglia, Ratliff and Cooter (1997).
2 North (1990) Observes, "The inability of societies to develop effective, low cost enforcement is the most
important source of both historical and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World."
3 A society cannot have much borrowing and lending or reap gains from mutually advantageous trade unless
individuals and firms have the right to make contracts with one another that will be impartially enforced.
4 The tradition of Williamson points to Vertical integartion or to the production  of non-specialised goods for the
spot market whenever contracts cannot be well specified ( Williamson (1985)).
5 The traditional literature on inventories is the standard competitive theory which predicts that at equilibrium,
inventories will be held only when the rate of change in prices, net of storage costs and depreciation is equal to
the market rate of interest (Benjamin and Benjamin (1993), Scheinkman and Schechtman, (1983)). Other models
of inventories concentrate on the volatility in the prices of raw materials which create supply shocks (Kahn,
James A (1987)). In the case of finished goods inventories the explanation offered is that firms cannot predict
demand perfectly (Eichenbaum (1984), Benjamin and Benjamin (1993)).
6 Clague et.al (1997), Trebilcock, M.J  in Buscaglia et. al (1997).
7 See levin and Rayo (preliminary draft, 2003). Baker, Gibbon and Murphy (2002a,b), Brown, Falk and Fehr
(forthcoming).
8 Clague C, Keefer,P Knack, S and Olsen,M (1997) in  Clague,C (1997).
9 Fafchamps, M.J,  Gunning W, and Oostendrop,R. (2000) study what they call „contractual risk“ motive for
holding inventories in Zimbabwean firms. However we are interested to know if the relationship of risk and
inventories is systematic across countries with differing degrees of contractual risk.
10 It could be argued that holding inventories may in fact be efficient, i.e a less costly way of doing business
rather than improving the legal system of a country. However it is clear that the benfits of an improved legal
system is not simply a reduction in inventories but  has  far reaching benefits which go beyond a saving related
to lower inventory holdings.
11 To use De Soto’s terminology. De Soto, H. (2000).
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12 There can be many more subdivisions of these three categories by companies in their balance sheets- but these
three groups more or less cover them.
13 This was true especially for India. The two main sources for the data are indiainfoline.com and The Prowess
Data Base collated by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy, Government of India. In this regard the
authors would like to thank Dr.K.S.Sujit for generously providing us access to this data base.
14 Several other ratios could have been chosen, for example, the ratio of Inventories to Total assets, or the Ratio
of Inventories to Total Fixed assets. However both these ratios could pose problems: The ratio of Inventories to
Total assets has the defect that in many developed countries, ownership of other companies is also part of the
total assets of a company- and for firms from developing countries this may not be substantial although their
operations within the preview of the product may be similar to firms in developed or high income countries. The
ratiocould then be biased downwards for developed countries. Similarly, the ratio of Inventories to Total Fixed
assets could be biased due to the nature of techonology- More Capital intensive technologies could creat a
smaller ratio than a firm which uses relatively less capital and this could be the case for developing countries.
15 Thus, USA and Canada as well as Australia have been put under one group. Although geographically
Australia doesnot ´´fit´, it certainly doesnot imbibe the culture and characteristics of the East Asian countries.
16Dudley, and Lasserre, (1989) .
17 It would have been ideal if output volatility was calculated as a lagged variable. However this was not possible
due to the unavailability of data for preceeding years for the firms in question. Such figures were available for
only India.
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APPENDIX








White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CONNECTED 1.140121 1.359314 0.838747 0.4022
REALINT 0.014183 0.016660 0.851284 0.3952
BEV 1.749620 2.144267 0.815952 0.4151
CEMENT 0.862322 1.011198 0.852772 0.3943
COAL 1.834827 2.241188 0.818685 0.4135
TYRES 0.681272 0.801585 0.849906 0.3959
C -3.278740 5.515989 -0.594407 0.5526
CORRUP^2 0.011758 0.013626 0.862929 0.3887
FITTED^2 0.652638 0.562824 1.159576 0.2470
R-squared 0.142935     Mean dependent var 2.815995
Adjusted R-squared 0.124253     S.D. dependent var 0.769988
S.E. of regression 0.720566     Akaike info criterion 2.206084
Sum squared resid 190.5518     Schwarz criterion 2.300144
Log likelihood -405.7438     F-statistic 7.650709
Regional dummy test with China
Dependent Variable: LOG(INVSALES)
Method: Least Squares




White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
CONNECTED -0.393143 0.113988 -3.448995 0.0006
REALINT -0.002373 0.003462 -0.685534 0.4934
BEV -0.745455 0.127053 -5.867285 0.0000
CEMENT -0.305446 0.103126 -2.961862 0.0033
TYRES -0.211628 0.103187 -2.050925 0.0410
COAL -0.791832 0.183077 -4.325120 0.0000
CORRUP^2 -0.002764 0.001689 -1.636542 0.1026
GROUP6 0.501012 0.143272 3.496943 0.0005
C 3.028643 0.114233 26.51295 0.0000
R-squared 0.166438     Mean dependent var 2.815995
Adjusted R-squared 0.148268     S.D. dependent var 0.769988
S.E. of regression 0.710617     Akaike info criterion 2.178279
Sum squared resid 185.3264     Schwarz criterion 2.272338
Log likelihood -400.5164     F-statistic 9.159903
Durbin-Watson stat 1.782010     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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